Potential Analogues to Authenticating Social
Media-Authenticating Other Types of Evidence . . . . 215 Whenever parties seek to introduce out-of-court statements, evidentiary issues of hearsay and authentication will arise. As methods of communication expand, the Federal Rules of Evidence must necessarily keep pace. The Rules remain essentially the same, but their application varies with new modes of communication. Evidence law has been very adaptable in some ways and notoriously conservative, even stodgy, in others. Although statements on Facebook and other social media raise some interesting questions concerning the hearsay rule and its exceptions, there has been little concern about applying the hearsay doctrine to such forms of communication. By contrast, such new media have triggered what could be characterized as a judicial "freak-out" concerning how to authenticate statements made via social media.
Part II of this Article defines and explains the function of social media, and Part III discusses where evidence from social media currently appears in modern trials. (The short answer is: everywhere.)
Part IV discusses hearsay questions raised by statements on Facebook and Twitter, arguing that, with some small exceptions, the Rules are perfectly well-suited to deal with such new media and that courts face few problems in doing so.
Part V documents the divergent approaches courts have taken to authenticating evidence from social media. Although some argue that the capacity for false authorship and fraud is so great that new rules are necessary, the majority of scholars and practitioners believe that the current rules of authentication are adequate, though there is much disagreement about their application. After setting out the evidence standard for authentication and the various approaches of recent cases, Part V criticizes the overly cautious and restrictive approach of some courts.
Part VI advocates for the more open approach to authenticating social media adopted by some courts. It goes further, arguing for a rebuttable presumption of authenticity barring credible evidence of appropriation or hacking. As with other types of technology when first introduced-photographs, telephone calls, x-rays-an inevitable transition period exists as affect social status and business advertising. 16 It is possible to "unfriend" a fellow Facebook user, a term that was recognized by the Oxford American Dictionary as the word of the year in 2009. 17 Unlike blogs or YouTube videos, where the creator of content has little control over who ultimately reads or watches it, social networking sites provide users with the option of controlling the initial dissemination of their posted information. 18 The user's homepage has privacy levels that he or she can adjust regarding who has access to the user's page, 19 though for evidentiary purposes, the privacy settings are meaningless-they have no influence on issues of admissibility.
Other prominent social networking providers include MySpace, which operates similarly to Facebook and focuses heavily on music and popular culture, 20 and LinkedIn, which is a more professional, less social version of networking. 21 In a variation of other social networking sites, another website, Twitter, is "a real-time information network" connecting followers to brief information bites. 22 Twitter communications are denominated "tweets," which are "small bursts of information" 140 characters long. which is open to the general public such as a music area, video section, and members' profiles, which are not set as 'private.' However, to create a profile, upload and display photographs, communicate with persons on the site, write 'blogs,' and/or utilize other services or applications on the MySpace website, one must be a 'member.' Anyone can become a member of MySpace at no charge so long as he or she meets a minimum age requirement and register.") (citations omitted).
21. See About Us, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited June 24, 2012) ("LinkedIn operates the world's largest professional network on the Internet with more than 161 million members in over 200 countries and territories."). All these media can be accessed not only on a regular computer, but also on tablets and cell phones. 24 Evidence is growing that social media, particularly Twitter, is addictive. 25 Twitter and Facebook have been excoriated for derogating the quality of communication, increasing isolation, 26 and fostering cyberbullying. They have also been lauded for their roles in bringing people together, most notably in aiding the Arab Spring, allowing revolutionaries to broadcast stories and disseminate pictures as events unfolded. 27 Wherever one stands on the benefits of these new social media, their effects on American culture are marked.
Because caselaw necessarily lags behind technological advances, many of the cases involve MySpace, which is on the wane, and fewer involve Facebook, which is currently the social media leader and has grown exponentially. 28 The real next big thing, however, looks to be Twitter, which courts have barely considered.
short communications called 'tweets,' and to read the tweets of other users. Users can, among other things, monitor, or 'follow,' other users' tweets.").
24 29, 2012) , http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/patrick-garratt/ twitter-addictions-more-difficult-to-quit-than-drugs_b_1305760.html (" [W] e've seen the internet revolutionise the way we interact with one another, with Facebook emerging as the global connectivity poster boy, but nothing else matches the pure buzz of Twitter."); Larry Carlat, Confessions of a Tweeter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes/2011/11/13/magazine/confessions-of-a-tweeter.html?_r =1 (detailing the author's loss of jobs and relationships due to his Twitter compulsion The social media revolution affects many areas of litigation other than evidence law. 29 For instance, attorneys use social media to check out potential jurors during voir dire. 30 Similarly, attorneys may investigate potential witnesses on Facebook to learn about them, to anticipate problems with cross-examination, or to begin to craft ways to impeach them. An interesting question of ethics has arisen concerning whether attorneys may instruct private investigators to "friend" witnesses without disclosing their motives and association with the litigation. 31 Social media is a major factor in juror misconduct during trial and deliberation. 32 Juror misbehavior on the Internet, either by gathering outside information in contravention of the judge's instructions or by posting confidential juror information or opinions mid-trial, occurs with increasing frequency. 33 In a very unusual Australian case-perhaps a sign of things to comea defendant with a default judgment against him was served with notice of the default via his Facebook page, which he checked regularly.
34
By far the most interesting and difficult questions pertaining to social media outside the area of evidence law arise in discovery. In civil cases, courts are struggling with how a party can obtain evidence of an opponent's social media output. In criminal cases, issues of search and seizure arise. These questions are beyond the scope of this Article, which examines the admissibility of such social media, not how it is obtained. Even when not admissible, however, social media can provide significant relevant information.
35

B. Social Media's Relevance to Litigation Issues Involving the Admission of Evidence
Increasingly, evidentiary issues concerning the admission of social media arise in both civil and criminal cases. It is not hard to see why parties might value Facebook posts and tweets, which are often spontaneous, uncensored, newsy, and self-revelatory. 36 In fact, not consulting social media for investigative and evidence purposes has been deemed by some as legal malpractice. 37 Furthermore, social media users may not realize how accessible and public their information is. 38 In one example that had less to do with the content of the speech than the fact of having made it, an accused offered as an alibi that he could not have committed the crime because at the time of the crime, he was logged into his Facebook account posting updates to his page. 39 The prosecution accepted his argument as sufficient to drop the charges. 40 More often, however, it is the prosecution that wishes to introduce evidence about the 34 accused, including evidence where the accused boasts of her crime. 41 Alternatively, the prosecutor may wish to introduce a picture of the accused from her Facebook page, toting weapons in violation of her parole. 42 In another variation, a party may wish to demonstrate that a witness was threatened.
43 Social media may be one method of criminal stalking or bullying. 44 Finally, social media can be important at sentencing to refute allegations of remorse, such as the Facebook pictures of a drunk driver partying with alcohol and making flip comments about being drunk postconviction. 45 In civil cases, Facebook or other social media can provide evidence of a tort, such as harassment or defamation. 46 Social media postings can also support the defense in various tort areas, most notably personal injury, sick leave, 47 and workers' compensation. A plaintiff who claims she is immobilized or severely limited in her activities may provide substantive and impeachment evidence for the defense if she posts pictures of herself rock climbing, bowling, or line dancing. 48 The issues of admissibility are important not just for evidentiary rulings at trial, but also for pre-trial summary judgment motions, which must be supported by admissible evidence. Because any statements made on social media are by definition out-ofcourt, they will at least raise traditional hearsay concerns and, in criminal cases, raise confrontation issues if the government wishes to use the out-ofcourt statement against the accused and the declarant does not testify. Any statement on social media made outside the courtroom will trigger questions about hearsay, authentication (which is discussed in the next section), and best evidence 52 (which is not addressed in this Article because no interesting or special questions arise from the context of social media).
53
A. Statements Admitted Not for Their Truth but for Another Purpose
Not all out-of-court statements qualify as hearsay. The Federal Rules define hearsay as statements that are used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 54 In other words, an out-of-court-statement is hearsay only if the trier of fact is being asked to believe that the statement is true. Where the statement is not being offered for its truth but is being offered just to show that it was uttered, the statement is not being offered for a hearsay purpose. When, for instance, the MySpace page of the accused was used to show his gang nickname and paraphernalia, but not the assertions in the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and therefore may not consider unauthenticated documents); Lorraine v messages, the court explained that the accused's "hearsay challenge is without merit because the trial court did not admit the MySpace material for the truth of any assertion on the page." 55 The court explained further that the accused's hearsay objection failed because the nature of the evidence here did not consist of declarative assertions to be assessed as truthful or untruthful, but rather circumstantial evidence of [the accused]'s active gang involvement. For example, a reasonable jury would understand its purpose was not to determine whether [the accused] and his "Krew" were truly "Most Wanted" by the "Ladiez" in Orange County. 56 Classic examples of statements that are not hearsay because they are being offered for a purpose other than their truth include circumstantial evidence of state of mind, effect on the listener, statements offered for impeachment, and legally operative facts. Some posts on social media will fall into these categories. On the issue of impeachment, 57 for instance, to show that a party was aware of an allegedly dangerous condition, warnings by posters on his Facebook page could be admissible not to prove the dangerous condition but to demonstrate effect on the listener-that the party was aware of them. Although I could find no example using social media, courts regularly allow evidence of notice on email to be introduced as outside the hearsay bar. 58 Statements of defamation, extortion, conspiracy, or threat would all be legally operative facts and hence not fit within the hearsay definition. Statements on social media could also be used to refresh the recollection of the declarant who is testifying. Jogging the memory of a witness with a document is not a hearsay use.
59
B. Parties' Statements Offered by Party Opponents
Much of what might be offered at trial will, however, be introduced for its truth and hence fit the classical definition of hearsay. Even when a statement is technically hearsay according to the common law definition, some statements are deemed "not hearsay" under the Federal Rules because they fall within specified exemptions. 60 The most useful exemption for social media is statements by the parties themselves. Anything a party 55 63 This huge exemption from hearsay affects much of the evidence parties will attempt to introduce at trial, particularly in civil cases. The exemption applies not only to direct personal statements but also to statements made by agents, employees, and co-conspirators. In State v. Greer, 64 the Ohio appellate court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the accused's own statements from his MySpace page that were offered by the government. In a South Carolina case, an alleged bank robber logged into his MySpace page to inform his followers: "On tha run for robbin a bank Love all of yall." 65 That message was admissible.
C. Prior Consistent Statements of Witnesses
Sometimes a party will wish to introduce his own statement. Just because the party testifies does not necessarily render his prior consistent statements admissible. When a party's statement is offered by the party himself and not the party opponent, a hearsay question arises. Such statements may fall within other exemptions or exceptions to the hearsay rule.
States vary significantly in their treatment of a witness's prior consistent statement (including that of a party). Under certain circumstances, the Federal Rules of Evidence allow such evidence both for common-law rehabilitation and for the truth of the matter asserted. 66 The Rules limit the substantive use of prior consistent statements of witnesses to situations where the proponent wishes to rebut a charge that the declarant recently fabricated his current testimony or acted from a recent improper motive or influence. 67 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, to be admissible, the prior statement must have been made after the alleged motive to fabricate arose. 68 Essentially, for non-hearsay rehabilitation, the evidence is being used to say, "You see, the witness has been saying this all along." 69 For its substantive use, the theory is, "You see, the witness has said it all along, it's true, and you can use the witness's prior consistent statement as evidence."
D. State of Mind
One frequent use of statements on social media is to prove the state of mind of the speaker. Although hearsay, such statements are nevertheless admissible for their truth because they fall under a special exception for the declarant's "then existing mental, emotional or physical condition." 70 The exception covers statements relating to motive, intent, plan, and feelings, both physical and emotional. 71 The exception does not include statements of memory or belief, so the memory of a feeling or the then-belief of a fact is not covered by the exception. [G]iven the ubiquity of communications in electronic media (e-mail, text messages, chat rooms, internet postings on servers like "myspace" or "youtube" or on blogs, voice mail, etc.), it is not surprising that many statements involving observations of events surrounding us, statements regarding how we feel, our plans and motives, and our feelings (emotional and physical) will be communicated in electronic medium.
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For instance, the accused assaulter of Representative Gabrielle Gifford posted a message on his MySpace page saying "Goodbye friends" hours before he went on his shooting rampage. 74 That post could help establish intent and could serve as evidence of premeditation. 75 In People v. Oyerinde, the trial court admitted Facebook page statements to demonstrate the victim's state of mind, but the appellate court indicated that the evidence, though ultimately harmless error, should have been excluded as facts remembered or believed. 
E. Present Sense Impressions
The present sense impression creates a hearsay exception for statements "describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it."
77 A statement such as, "My, the sun is bright," qualifies as a present sense impression because it was made while the event was occurring, arguably before the declarant has the time or presence of mind to conjure something untrue. 78 Arguably, most postings on Facebook and MySpace will not qualify because of the timing requirement, since most posts are made sufficiently later than the time the declarant perceived the event.
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Professor Jeffery Bellin has raised interesting questions about the present sense impression with regard to Twitter. 80 Because tweets are sometimes composed while the event is occurring, they seem to fit this hearsay exception. Status updates on Facebook and Google+ might also have comparable immediacy. Bellin posits that the current exception was not designed with social media in mind and that one guarantee of trustworthiness-the presence of others who can testify not only to the statement but also to the underlying event or condition-is noticeably absent when present-sense statements are communicated via Twitter.
81
A traditional present sense impression uttered to fellow passengers, such as, "That Ford pickup is weaving all over the road," would have corroborative witnesses-if not about the truck's behavior, then about what was happening with the declarant. A tweet concerning the same occurrence would not. Tweeting and other social media forms of concurrent updating are meant for public consumption and entertainment. As one compulsive tweeter explained: "When I wasn't on Twitter, I would compose faux aphorisms that I might use later." 82 The declarant expects to communicate with a far-flung audience that cannot verify the truth of the tweets. Bellin is persuasive in arguing for the return of some sort of corroboration requirement before tweets and analogous forms of immediate social media communication are admitted as present sense impressions.
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
78. The reliability of present sense impressions stems from:
(1) the report at the moment of the thing then seen, heard, etc., is safe from any error from defect of memory of the declarant; (2) there is little or no time for a calculated misstatement; and (3) the statement will usually be made to another (the witness who reports it) who would have the equal opportunity to observe and hence to check a misstatement. 
F. Excited Utterances
Another exception to the hearsay rule is the excited utterance, which creates a hearsay exception for statements "relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement" of the precipitating condition. 83 The theory of the exception is that under the stress of the excitement, the declarant will not have the opportunity to confabulate. 84 Although there is a built-in timing requirement (the length of time the declarant remains under stress), the time between the event and the declaration is not as short as with the present sense impression. Because the excited utterance requires a startling event that still holds the declarant in its thrall, it is a poor fit with social media. If a person is calm enough to tweet or to update her Facebook status, then the effect of the startling event has passed.
G. Recorded Recollections-But Not Business Records
Tweets and posts to Facebook do not qualify as business records. Statements made by individuals for non-business purposes on social media cannot qualify as business records. They simply lack the business purpose and routine practice of recording such business activity that the business record rule requires. 85 However, they may qualify as recorded recollections if (1) the declarant cannot fully remember the incident, (2) the writing was made when the event was fresh in the declarant's memory, and (3) the writing accurately reflects the declarant's knowledge. 86 If a tweet or a Facebook comment or update is admitted under the recorded recollection exception, it is generally read into the record and may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.
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H. Dying Declarations
There is already sad evidence of suicide notes on Twitter and Facebook. 88 A post on social media could fit the requirements of a dying declaration. The declarant would have to be unavailable, the statement would have to be made while the declarant believed he was dying, and it would have to concern the cause of death. 89 Dying declarations have recently attracted more attention because the Supreme Court has indicated that they are a sui generis exception to the Confrontation Clause.
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I. Declarations Against Interest
A statement against interest is one that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . .
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To be admissible, the declarant must be unavailable 92 and the statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.
93
The Supreme Court has explained that "only those declarations . . . that are individually self-inculpatory" are admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). 94 Whether a statement meets the interest criteria can only be judged in context. 95 The declaration must be consciously against interest at the time it was made. As of this writing, I could find no case admitting a statement on social media via this exception. In one case, evidence of a person's salary posed on MySpace was not admissible because although detrimental to her custody case, it was not against interest at the time it was made. 96 exception is grounded in basic fairness. If a party wrongfully caused or acquiesced in making the declarant unavailable and intended to do so, then the party cannot be heard to complain that the statement is hearsay. As with declarations against interest, the exception applies only if the declarant is deemed unavailable.
K. The Residual Hearsay Exception
"To be admissible under Rule 807, the evidence must be (1) trustworthy, (2) material, (3) more probative than other available evidence, and must fulfill, (4) the interests of justice, and (5) notice."
99 Courts apply this residual or catch-all exception "very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." 100 Rule 807 is used as a back-up argument or part of a laundry list of exceptions when a court admits an out-of-court statement. For instance, one district court explained its ruling as follows: "The statements . . . are likely admissible because they will not be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and even if they are, they fall within one or more exceptions, specifically, the state of mind exception or the residual exception."
101 Federal district courts have admitted emails under this rule, but I have so far found no Facebook posts or other social-media material admitted under the residual hearsay exception.
102
L. The Confrontation Clause
In criminal matters, where a "testimonial statement" is offered against the accused for its truth, the evidence will have to satisfy the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford v. Washington.
103
Crawford held that testimonial statements offered against the accused must be subject to cross examination. 104 If the declarant is proven unavailable, then the prosecutor may use the testimonial statement only if the declarant had a previous opportunity to confront the accused. 105 The only exceptions to the Crawford rule are dying declarations and forfeiture, where the accused has intentionally made the declarant unavailable. 106 Hearsay exceptions that require unavailability (such as declarations against interest) trigger a Crawford inquiry in criminal cases. The complicated and unresolved question concerns the extent to which statements are "testimonial," intended as a substitute for in-court testimony or at the very 109 The authentication process requires two steps. 110 The first entails the gatekeeping role of the judge, who must determine whether a jury could find the item authentic; the second involves 108. See Goode, supra note 107, at 6 ("While electronic evidence does not present any particularly difficult analytical problems in terms of the law of evidence, it does pose some very real practical problems.") (footnotes omitted); Jaksic, supra note 45 (quoting John Palfrey, executive director of The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School: "There is a sense that this information would be admissible if it's verifiable, as with any other form of electronic discovery. The one issue is going to be authentication as far as what is said online and who said it."); Democko, supra note 1, at 371 ("[E]nacting new rules governing the authentication of electronic evidence, or specifically, evidence from social networking sites, is not only unnecessary, but counterproductive.").
109. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). This question is one of conditional relevance under FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
110. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539 (discussing a "two-step process" for authentication). . . . the fact that the judge permits [a] writing to be admitted in evidence does not necessarily establish the authenticity of the writing; all that the judge has determined is that there has been a sufficient showing of the authenticity of the writing to permit the trier of fact to find that it is authentic.
112
For example, in a case involving a contract on which the defendant claims his signature has been forged, the judge first considers the question of authentication. If no chance exists that it is the defendant's signature, then the document has no relevance, and the judge will keep it from the jury. Generally, however, if a legitimate question exists, the authenticity of the signature will next go to the jury, especially if it is an ultimate issue in the case. In construing and applying Rule 901, federal courts hold that "a document is properly authenticated if a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity."
113
The authentication rules are by their structure not very rule-like. In the Federal Rules of Evidence, various illustrations, "examples only-not a complete list," 114 follow the very general principle that the item must be what its proponent claims. Under the Rules, the relevant examples for methods of authentication include testimony of a witness with knowledge 115 and distinctive characteristics. 116 Unlike hearsay, which is very technical and categorical, 117 authentication is ultimately more flexible and practical, but less uniform and predictable.
Evidence law is conservative by nature and slow to adapt to new forms of technology.
118 Professor Jennifer Mnookin has written about the fascinating process by which courts slowly grew accustomed to the use of the 111. Id. at 539-40 (explaining that the court first determines whether the proponent has offered evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the evidence authentic and that the jury next decides authenticity as a matter of conditional relevance).
112 photograph as courtroom evidence. 119 In 1899, one court refused to admit photographs because " 'either through want of skill on the part of the artist, or inadequate instruments or materials, or through intentional and skillful manipulation, a photograph may be not only inaccurate, but dangerously misleading.' " 120 The now quaint-seeming opposition to photographs as evidence that parties cannot authenticate is eerily reminiscent of some of the current suspicions regarding the Internet and social media. In both cases, judges express concerns that through the "intentional and skillful manipulation" 121 of the proponent, jurors may be deceived by fakery and clever mock-ups.
B. Photographs
Ironically, social media raises few problems on the issue of photographs. The process of authenticating a photo from Twitter, MySpace, or Facebook is indistinguishable from authenticating a photo generally. A witness with knowledge must testify that the photograph is a fair and accurate representation of what it purports to be. 122 For instance, imagine someone were to snap a shot of a parent dancing naked on a bar with an alcoholic drink in hand and subsequently posted it on Facebook. In a custody dispute, if the dancer's ex-spouse wished to introduce the photo as evidence of alcoholism and bad judgment, anyone at the scene could authenticate the photo by testifying that it was a fair and accurate representation of the events of the evening in question.
Recently, commentators have raised questions about authenticating digital photographs because of the ease of altering or "photoshopping" them. 123 Such techniques for detecting alteration in digital photography are becoming increasingly sophisticated and inexpensive, 124 and valid concerns can be raised when digital images are enhanced. 125 To the extent that manipulation of digital photos is a problem, it is one not unique to social media, but rather represents a problem with digital photography generally. When faced with an authentication concern, one court noted: "Here, it was Jessica herself who acknowledged that indeed, she had been drinking alcohol and the pictures accurately reflected that activity. That testimony was sufficient to authentic the photographs and they were properly admitted into evidence." 126 Nevertheless, one recurrent use of photographs from social networking has posed a conundrum for courts. Often, parties wish to demonstrate the gang affiliation of a witness or an opposing party. 127 The State of California, in a guide entitled A Parent's Guide to Gangs, explains that "[g]ang members often communicate, recruit, socialize and sell drugs using the Internet and publish their own web page to show off their gang affiliation (MySpace, Bebo, Facebook, etc. 133 the accused claimed no knowledge of a drug conspiracy. To show that he was a member of the Latin King gang and knew the nature of the conspiracy, the government was allowed to present evidence concerning Cole's web page on MySpace. 134 His web page yielded evidence including photos depicting him wearing Latin King colors, Cole's listing of "drug wars" as a personal interest, and additional photos depicting Latin King members and Latin King symbols. 135 It is unclear whether the accused took the stand or whether any authentication questions were even raised about the MySpace page.
In People v. Lenihan, 136 the accused challenged his second-degree murder conviction by arguing that he was unfairly prohibited from crossexamining two state witnesses with photographs his mother had printed from MySpace that allegedly depicted the witnesses and the victim making hand gestures and wearing clothing suggesting affiliation with the Crips gang. 137 The New York appellate court approved the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to admit the witness's MySpace photos as a basis for cross-examination. 138 The court reasoned that because the defendant had no idea who took the photos and under what circumstances they were taken, "[i]n light of the ability to 'photo shop', or edit photographs on the computer, the defendant could not authenticate the photographs."
139 Additionally, the Court was persuaded that the photos did not establish a goodfaith basis for cross-examining the witnesses because the connection to the defendant was too remote and speculative, given that defendant denied being a member of a rival gang. 140 Similarly, in People v. Beckley, 141 the court held that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the defendant flashing a gang symbol on her MySpace page because "with the advent of computer software programs such as Adobe Photoshop it does not always take skill, experience, or even cognizance to alter a digital photo."
142 Apparently, the court required someone who was present at the time the photo was taken to testify that it accurately depicted what it purported to show. 143 The admission of the evidence, however, was deemed harmless error. 
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In both Cole and Lenihan, the courts' emphasis on the technology and the photographer seems misplaced. The photos of individuals flashing gang signs should have been admissible if a person with knowledge had been at the event. Arguably, anyone who had seen the individual do so could testify that these photos were a fair and accurate representation of what the person looked like using gang signs. In the Lenihan case, which involved cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the witness himself could have served as a person with knowledge, and the accused should at least have been able to pose initial questions to see if the MySpace page could be authenticated.
C. Authenticating Posts, Updates, and Tweets
Even more difficult than the issues surrounding authenticating photographs are the authentication questions concerning written posts, messages, and tweets on social networks. The initial response from courts has been mixed. Back in 1999, in St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 145 a court opined: "There is no way Plaintiff can overcome the presumption that the information he discovered on the Internet is inherently untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the Internet . . . Hackers can adulterate the content on any website."
146 Thirteen years later, one can still find courts that are extremely wary of the new-fangled ways that young people communicate. 147 One can also find contrary examples, however, where the courts, though aware of potential problems with authentication, nevertheless allow the admission of remarks transmitted via social media.
Courts generally address four types of authentication concerns: (1) general lack of proper foundation; (2) the possibility that the entire social networking page is a fake; 148 (3) the possibility that a genuine existing page has been hacked; and (4) the possibility that someone has appropriated the site of another by obtaining the password through friendship, phishing, 149 or a computer left logged on and unattended in a place where third parties could post in the owner's name. 150 Tweets, MySpace pages, and Facebook posts are not self-authenticating, as are, for instance, some certified public documents. 151 judges cannot just accept a piece of paper, printed out from a computer, and treat it as authentic without more (though I suspect this happens frequently in some courts, particularly with pro se litigants in domestic disputes). Authentication is easy where the party admits that the page is hers and she made the post, as this fairly comports with the example of authentication by a person with knowledge. But what if the alleged poster is not a party, or is a party who does not take the witness stand (such as where she exercises her right against self-incrimination) or simply denies the post as her own? Courts struggling with these questions have reached very different results.
The Stricter Approach
In Griffin v. State, 152 the Maryland Supreme Court, in a long opinion, reversed and remanded a conviction, holding that pages from MySpace admitted against the accused were not properly authenticated. The State sought to introduce the MySpace profile of the accused's girlfriend to demonstrate that she threatened another witness, who had significantly changed his testimony upon retrial. 153 The accused's girlfriend was not questioned about the pages. 154 Instead, the State attempted to authenticate the pages as belonging to her through the testimony of the lead investigator in the case. 155 The trial judge allowed the investigator to testify in support of authentication because the page (1) contained the photograph of a person who looked like the girlfriend, (2) used the nickname "Boozy" for her boyfriend, a known nickname of the accused, (3) included the girlfriend's date of birth, and (4) contained the post: "FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!" 156 In authenticating the threat, the trial court reasoned that the posting contained identifying factors and information that only a few people would know and was posted from her regular social media address.
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The Maryland Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "[t]he identity of who generated the profile may be confounding, because 'a person observing the online profile of a user with whom the observer is unacquainted has no idea whether the profile is legitimate. ' 159 The Court therefore found that the "potential for fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a social networking site thus poses significant challenges from the standpoint of authentication of printouts of the site." 160 The Maryland Supreme Court also stated that an inadequate foundation was laid for authenticating the MySpace page because the State failed to offer any extrinsic evidence describing MySpace, explain how the investigator obtained the MySpace pages at issue, or adequately authenticate the MySpace profile and the posting as belonging to the accused's girlfriend. The Court took seriously the prospect that "someone other than the alleged author may have accessed the account and posted the message in question" and "that another user could have created the profile in issue or authored the 'snitches get stitches' posting." 161 The girlfriend's picture, coupled with her birth date and location, were not deemed sufficiently "distinctive characteristics" to authenticate the printout from the MySpace account, given the possibility that the girlfriend might not have made the page in the first place. 162 The Griffin majority suggested what would constitute adequate forms of authentication, noting that the "first, and perhaps most obvious method would be to ask the purported creator if she indeed created the profile and also if she added the posting in question."
163 Second, the court suggested searching the computer of the person who allegedly owns the page or made the posting "to determine whether that computer was used to originate the social networking profile and posting in question." 164 Third, the court suggested "obtain[ing] information directly from the social networking website that links the establishment of the profile to the person who allegedly created it and also links the posting sought to be introduced to the person who initiated it." 165 Two judges dissented in Griffin, arguing that the MySpace page was adequately authenticated. The dissenters believed that a reasonable juror could conclude, based on the picture, birthday, and references to freeing "Boozy," that the redacted printed pages of the MySpace profile demonstrated sufficiently distinct characteristics to demonstrate that they were what the prosecution claimed them to be. 166 The dissent explained its view that "[t]he technological heebie jeebies discussed in the Majority Opinion go . . . not to the admissibility of the print-outs . . . but rather to the weight to be given the evidence by the trier of fact." 167 The dissent also noted that " [t] he potentialities that are of concern to the Majority Opinion are fit subjects for cross-examination or rebuttal testimony." 168 
Commonwealth v. Williams
169 provides another example of a strict approach to authentication of social media. In Williams, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts would not admit instant messages a witness had received through her account on MySpace. 170 The witness testified that the defendant's brother had contacted her "four times on her MySpace account . . . urging her not to testify . . . or to claim a lack of memory regarding the events of the night of the murder."
171 At trial, the witness testified that the accused's brother had a picture of himself on his MySpace page, she recognized his MySpace screen (from which she had previously received messages), and the document printed from her MySpace account indicated that the messages were in fact sent by a user with the brother's same screen name and picture. 172 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the State had laid an inadequate foundation to authenticate the MySpace messages because it failed to offer any evidence regarding who had access to the MySpace page and whether another author could have posted the messages:
Although it appears that the sender of the messages was using [the brother]'s MySpace Web "page," there is no testimony (from [the witness] or another) regarding how secure such a Web page is, who can access a MySpace Web page, whether codes are needed for such access, etc. . . . Here, while the foundational testimony established that the messages were sent by someone with access to Williams's MySpace Web page, it did not identify the person who actually sent the communication. Nor was there expert testimony that no one other than Williams could communicate from that Web page. 173 166. Id. at 429-30 (Harrell, J., dissenting) ("As long as a reasonable juror could conclude that the proffered evidence is what its proponent purports it to be, the evidence should be admitted.").
167. Jackson, the accused was charged with mail and wire fraud and obstruction of justice after making false claims of racial harassment against the United Parcel Service. 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000). At trial, the accused tried to admit postings from "the Euro-American Student Union and Storm Front," in which the white supremacist groups gloated about Jackson's case and took credit for the UPS mailings. Jackson, 208 F.3d at A final example of some courts' hesitancy in authenticating written posts from social media comes from Connecticut. In State v. Eleck, 174 the trial court excluded evidence that the accused wished to introduce from his Facebook account documenting messages sent to him from a key witness for the State. 175 The witness acknowledged that the message was sent from her Facebook account but denied that she had done it. She testified that someone had hacked into her account and changed her Facebook password. 176 The court expressed skepticism about her account being hacked, noting that "this suggestion is dubious under the particular facts at hand, given that the messages were sent before the alleged hacking of the account took place."
177 Furthermore, immediately after being questioned about her post in court, the witness removed the accused from her list of Facebook friends. 178 Despite doubting the hacking event mentioned by the witness, the court nevertheless found the refusal to authenticate the witness's post within the trial court's discretion. The court in Eleck explained:
The need for authentication arises in this context because an electronic communication, such as a Facebook message, an e-mail or a cell phone text message, could be generated by someone other than the named sender. This is true even with respect to accounts requiring a unique user name and password, given that account holders frequently remain logged in to their accounts while leaving their computers and cell phones unattended. Additionally, passwords and website security are subject to compromise by hackers. Consequently, proving only that a message came from a particular account, without further authenticating evidence, has been held to be inadequate proof of authorship.
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Given these authenticity concerns, "it was incumbent on the defendant, as the proponent, to advance other foundational proof to authenticate that the proffered messages did, in fact, come from [the witness] and not simply from her Facebook account." 180 The court found that mere proof of ownership was insufficient unless supplemented by authentication via identifying characteristics, which would have had to have been much 637. The court affirmed the trial court's refusal to admit the web page because it lacked an appropriate foundation; the accused did not demonstrate that the web postings "actually were posted by the groups, as opposed to being slipped onto the groups' websites by Jackson herself, who was a skilled computer user." Id. at 638.
174 183 The State also presented testimony from a witness whose photograph was included on the MySpace page, supporting the contention that it was Yates's MySpace account. The profile information, the picture of Yates as the account holder, and the use of the accused's email were also indicative of its being Yates's account. According to the appellate court, the MySpace postings "connected Yates to the shootings and disclosed his feelings of betrayal and being 'pissed off' by people talking to the police."
184 The court rejected the accused's argument that the State failed to properly authenticate the MySpace posting and establish that the postings belonged to him. The court noted that the authentication standard of evidence sufficient to support a finding "is not rigorous, and the threshold of admissibility articulated in it is low." 185 The court concluded that "Yates's contention that anyone could have created the postings goes to the weight of the evidence that the jury should consider." 188 The page displayed a picture of the accused's face and included greetings from friends and family members by name. The page contained a list of interests, which included gangs. 189 The court explained, with an ironic, dismissive tone, that "[t]his suggested the page belonged to Valdez, rather than someone else by the same name, who happened to look just like him." 190 The court acknowledged that the accused was free to argue otherwise to the jury but concluded that "a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the posting of personal photographs, communications, and other details that the MySpace page belonged to him." Ronnie Tienda. The pages were originally brought to the prosecution's attention by the victim's sister. 193 The State admitted the pages through the testimony of the victim's sister. 194 The prosecutor also offered affidavits and subscriber reports associated with each profile account that it subpoenaed from MySpace. 195 The subscriber reports indicated that the MySpace accounts were created by a "Ron Mr. T" or "Smiley Face" (the appellant's nickname). 196 The account holder wrote that he lived in "D TOWN" or "dallas" (as did the accused) and registered the accounts with a "ronnietiendajr@" or "smileys_shit @" email address. 197 The page included a mention of the deceased with the comment "RIP David Valadez" linked to a song that was played at the victim's funeral. 198 Instant message comments exchanged between the MySpace page holder and other MySpace users included specific references to the shooting and subsequent investigation. 199 The messages made specific reference to snitches, and the MySpace page owner complained about his electronic monitor, which was a condition of his house arrest pre-trial. 200 Tienda denied that the pages were his. In cross-examining the deceased's sister, "defense counsel elicited testimony regarding the ease with which a person could create a MySpace page in someone else's name and then send messages, purportedly written by the person reflected in the profile picture, without their approval." 201 The defense emphasized the prosecution's failure to prove through any technological or expert evidence that the appellant created the account.
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In affirming the admissibility of the MySpace pages, Tienda began by reviewing the generally low standard for authentication:
In performing its Rule 104 gate-keeping function, the trial court itself need not be persuaded that the proffered evidence is authentic. The preliminary question for the trial court to decide is simply whether the proponent of the evidence has supplied facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence he has proffered is authentic. 203 The court held that "the internal content of the MySpace postingsphotographs, comments, and music-was sufficient circumstantial evidence It is, of course, within the realm of possibility that the appellant was the victim of some elaborate and ongoing conspiracy. Conceivably some unknown malefactors somehow stole the appellant's numerous self-portrait photographs, concocted boastful messages about [the victim's] murder and the circumstances of that shooting, was aware of the music played at [the victim's] funeral, knew when the appellant was released on pretrial bond with electronic monitoring and referred to that year-long event along with stealing the photograph of the grinning appellant lounging in his chair while wearing his ankle monitor. But that is an alternate scenario whose likelihood and weight the jury was entitled to assess once the State had produced a prima facie showing that it was the appellant, not some unidentified conspirators or fraud artists, who created and maintained these MySpace pages. 206 Finally, in People v. Fielding, 207 a twenty-one year-old woman who was being prosecuted for having sex with a fourteen-year-old boy objected to the admission of their message exchanges on MySpace. The victim's father testified that he had printed all the communications between his son and the defendant from his son's MySpace account and did not alter them. 208 The accused argued that the messages were not sent by her and questioned the accuracy of the printouts that the boy's father had printed from the boy's computer, arguing it was possible to edit the conversations. This claim was bolstered by the fact that some conversations were not fully reproduced, and that the victim's MySpace page had once been hacked. 209 The court noted "the fact that a document was or may have been altered does not preclude a preliminary finding of authenticity, where the claimed alterations are immaterial." 210 The court also credited the testimony of the Id. at *3 (accused argued that "the packet of exchanges prepared by the victim's father was incomplete and inaccurate. For example, in the exchange which shows that she said she wanted to have sex, the victim erased her message, wrote a new message, and then replied to it. Other exchanges were not reproduced fully."). On cross-examination, the victim conceded that someone had "once 'hacked' into his MySpace account and changed the 'mood status' he had posted from 'I'm ready to win' to 'I'm ready to be gay.' " Id. at *4. 210. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). victim, who recognized the conversations on MySpace; the victim claimed he knew it was the accused because he was often "talking on the phone to her at the same time." 211 Ultimately, the court concluded that "the possibility that the incriminating messages purportedly coming from defendant were in fact sent or posted by someone else went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility."
212 In answer to a concern about ownership of the page, the trial court noted the defense could subpoena records from MySpace. In Lorraine, a long opinion full of dicta setting out the requirements of various forms of authentication, Judge Grimm rightly observed that "any serious consideration of the requirement to authenticate electronic evidence needs to acknowledge that, given the wide diversity of such evidence, there is no single approach to authentication that will work in all instances."
214 Although each form of electronic communication presents its own authentication conundrums, it is useful to try to draw analogies among various forms of evidence, particularly electronic evidence.
215
Courts have considerably more experience with authenticating phone call and emails (and, to a lesser extent, instant messages) than they do with social media.
216 Each type of communication presents possible templates for the authentication of Facebook pages and other social networking cites.
Like social media, phone calls and emails involve a level of anonymity and the potential for impersonation. 217 The example for authenticating a telephone call in the Federal Rules of Evidence requires an assigned number and either self-identification of the person or a call to a business for business-related transactions. 218 In Williams, 219 the court analogized a message on MySpace to a telephone call, and noted that: 215. The history of photograph authentication reveals courts' tendencies to engage in analogic reasoning, searching for what social media is most similar to among the types of evidence that we already know how to authenticate. See Mnookin, supra note 119. Professor Mnookin makes a persuasive case that the analogies have transformative effects in both directions, changing understanding not only of the novel entity, but also the types of evidence it was compared to that formed the basis for the analogy. Id. at 74. In this moment of great flux, where courts are divided on the questions of authenticating social media, it will be interesting to see how phone calls and emails are used as analogies and how, in turn, authentication of social media may alter how these relatively accepted forms of evidence are authenticated.
216. See Democko, supra note 1 (drawing the analogy to email and instant messaging The Williams analysis is faulty. If we know someone is calling from his own phone (something easily accomplished with caller ID) and self-identifies when he calls (e.g., "Hi, this is Bob."), that would be sufficient under Rule 901(b)(6) to authenticate the phone call. A posting on Bob's Facebook page actually provides more points of identification such as photos, birth date, geographic information, and time stamp.
Another potential analogy is to email, a form of electrically stored information with which judges are probably more familiar. Emails tend to be authenticated by their distinctive characteristics, such as content displaying familiarity with people and events that its purported authors know. Also, the timeline of email exchanges may correlate with other established events.
221 Metadata 222 embedded in the email also can trace its provenance. Finally, when the email involves a reply, it is reasonable to assume that the replying writer is authentically the sender, since the original writer will recognize the original email content and be able to explain where he ("Email communications may be authenticated as being from the purported author based on an affidavit of the recipient; the e-mail address from which it originated; comparison of the content to other evidence; and/or statements or other communications from the purported author acknowledging the e-mail communication that is being authenticated.").
222. Metadata is defined as "data providing information about one or more aspects of the data, such as:
• Means of creation of the data; • Purpose of the data; • Time and date of creation;
• Creator or author of data; • Location on a computer network where the data was created; and • Standards used.
For example, a digital image may include metadata that describes how large the picture is, the color depth, the image resolution, when the image was created, and other data. A text document's metadata may contain information about how long the document is, who the author is, when the document was written, and a short summary of the document." Metadata, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Metadata (last visited June 24, 2012). sent it. 223 The mere "from" on an email without more is probably insufficient to authenticate the email, 224 but additional information from "confirming circumstances," 225 such as use of the proper password, attachments that help identify the sender, special language, non-public information, and metadata about the trail of the email can assist in authentication. 226 According to one Massachusetts court, claims of hacking email go to the weight and not the admissibility of email messages."
227 Social media, while sharing some attributes with phone calls and emails, have their own distinctive characteristics. 228 In some ways, social media seems more amenable to easy identification because they often contain date stamps and photos.
Which Approach is Better?
Judge Grimm, author of Lorraine's long exegesis regarding admissibility of electronically stored information, argues that "the inability to get evidence admitted because of a failure to authenticate it almost always is a self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful advance preparation."
229 Given some courts' strict approach to authenticating social media, I beg to differ. Although it is true much of the time that failure to prepare adequately can leave an attorney flat-footed when trying to authenticate a piece of evidence, in this time of transition when courts are only slowly accommodating to the new social media and new means of communication, some courts are unnecessarily grudging in authenticating information emanating from social networking sites. App'x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2012) (authenticating instant messenger chats between the accused and his victims "because the victims were able to testify to the contents.").
224. See Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 378, 381 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) ("Evidence that the defendant's name is written as the author of an e-mail or that the electronic communication originates from an e-mail or a social networking Web site such as Facebook or MySpace that bears the defendant's name is not sufficient alone to authenticate the electronic communication as having been authored or sent by the defendant.") (citations omitted). Goode, supra note 107, at 12 ("E-mail accounts can be used without the owner's permission. Therefore, the mere fact that an e-mail bears a particular e-mail address will often prove inadequate to authenticate the identity of the author; typically courts demand at least a little more evidence.").
225. ). Professor Imwinkelried also provides detailed instruction on how to authenticate email messages using cryptography that require evidence that the user owns the key to unlock the cryptography and provides a sample foundation for proving the chain of custody for the handling of email by an email service). Id.
227. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 381-82. In Purdy, the email messages were actually found on the hard drive of the computer. Id.
228. Cf. Payne, supra note 8, at 842 (distinguishing information on social media from other electronically stored information for discovery purposes because evidence from social media is (1) more difficult to access, (2) personal, (3) inherently intimate and carries with it privacy implications, and (4) allows users to choose who can view their information Two procedural matters necessarily focus the debate. The first concerns the evidentiary standard for authentication. As the court in Lorraine observed: "A party seeking to admit an exhibit need only make a prima facie showing that it is what he or she claims it to be. This is not a particularly high barrier to overcome." 231 Unsurprisingly, the courts that are liberal in allowing authentication of social media emphasize this standard, which sets a very low bar for admission. 232 Second, in understanding appellate court decisions, it is important to acknowledge that the standard of review is abuse of discretion. As the Tienda court explained: "If the trial court's ruling that a jury could reasonably find proffered evidence authentic is at least 'within the zone of reasonable disagreement,' a reviewing court should not interfere." 233 Technically, a reviewing court should only decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in making the authentication ruling. However, many courts seem to be taking the opportunity to explain their views of authentication, while leaving the status quo in place by resorting to the harmless error doctrine when they disagree with the trial court's ruling.
To analyze how courts may be making the authentication task more challenging than it should be, it is worth separating concerns about page ownership from concerns about hijacking of the page.
a. Page Ownership
Certainly, it makes sense that the proponent of the social network evidence somehow proves ownership of the page or profile in question. That can be done easily if the page owner is a witness. If the owner of the page is present, it is worth authenticating the page, at least so far as that the page exists and the witness created it. 234 How should a party authenticate the ownership of the site when such ownership is denied by its purported creator or when the purported creator is not a witness who can be questioned? When the page owner does not testify from personal knowledge, other means of authentication include: (1) verification by the provider regarding who set up the page, (2) an expert who found traces of the page on the purported owner's computer, 235 (3) statement of another witness with knowledge of the page or account's ownership, and (4) circumstantial evidence that the page belongs to its purported owner.
Parties can obtain provider verification with a warrant or a valid subpoena. The providers do not, however, verify the content of the site-they just verify who created the page. 236 Verification from the provider and expert analysis of the owner's computer to establish ownership can be expensive and time-consuming. Because no other person may have first-hand knowledge of the page or account ownership, courts must decide whether social network pages can be authenticated via the circumstantial evidence of distinctive characteristics, as anticipated by Rule 901(b)(4). In United States v. Grant, 237 the court relied on Mil. R. Evid. 901(b)(4) to authenticate evidence via "[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances . . . ." 238 Each Facebook message contained the name of the accused and included a picture of him in uniform. 239 The witness testified that she had chatted about events known to her and the accused on the Facebook page in question and texted the accused using a number transmitted to her on that same Facebook account. 240 Another form of circumstantial evidence is the behavior of the purported page-owner. Courts can consider the fact that the page or posting was taken down immediately after a party inquired about it in the litigation process. 241 
b. Concerns About Creating a Fake Page
Least convincing is the concern that the page was just a made-up farce or an attempt to frame an innocent person. Certainly, there are examples of people making fake pages on behalf of others. To create a free page on a social network does not require much-just a full name, email address, password, gender, and date of birth. 242 Even when the person does exist, however, fake pages are usually easy to spot for what they are. 243 For instance, it is not hard to find pranks where students make fake, unflattering social networking pages about their school principals, 244 or someone creates a MySpace page purportedly in the name of a church pastor describing homosexual conduct and drug use. 245 Such pages are self-evident parodies easy to unmask as non-genuine. Where a genuine question arises about who owns the page, the service providers can be subpoenaed to provide that information. As I argue below, that should not be standard procedure in every case.
c. Concerns About Hacking or Opportunistic Signing on to Someone Else's Page
It is also possible for someone to hack into or temporarily appropriate an existing page. 246 This can be accomplished by installing malicious software to record keystrokes, stealing or cracking someone's password, or gaining the trust of someone who is duped into voluntarily sharing access information. 247 The court in State v. Eleck deemed the potential for hacking a crucial factor that "highlights the general lack of security of the medium . . . ." 248 In Commonwealth v. Purdy, 249 the accused in a prostitution case objected to the authenticity of emails, claiming that his computer was located "near the massage room" and that "it was always on and that other people in the salon, particularly the masseuses, knew the passwords to his computer and used the computer frequently. He testified that they used his e-mail account to play pranks on him and that they answered e-mails in his name." 250 Some commentators believe that this risk is so substantial that authentication of the owner's account is insufficient and that courts must insist on heightened authentication proving actual authorship. 251 I disagree and find myself supporting the logic of the court in Tienda 252 -that such elaborate hoaxes are unlikely and should not drive the authentication process.
Certainly, it is possible that others will post maliciously on a page to which they gain unfair access. Where others regularly have access, such as a joint email account or a Facebook page to which the owner has shared the password, it is certainly credible that someone could have maliciously posted to damage another's reputation or chances in litigation. For instance, a married couple might share a social networking page. If they divorce, one could easily believe that one spouse could make damaging posts facially attributable to the soon-to-be ex-spouse. 253 Even that situation, however, should not automatically bar authentication. Instead, the court should weigh various factors and, in general, leave it to the finder of fact to assess the likelihood that the postings are fraudulent.
Some fact patterns do indeed demand a finding by the court that the posting is inauthentic. When a page owner can demonstrate that she was locked out of her Facebook account on the relevant dates postings were made and that she complained to the provider that her access was cut off, that constitutes grounds for rejecting the authenticity of the post. Similarly, if a post is taken down, the password is changed, and the person immediately disavows the posting as soon as she regains use of the site, the judge should probably reject the post as inauthentic. Remarkably, many of those denying that they made a post on their social network pages never bothered to take it down until after it presented legal trouble.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
So much modern communication already transpires over new media such as Facebook that lawyers and judges must find reliable and inexpensive ways to accommodate the huge volumes of information and potential courtroom evidence these sites generate. On the hearsay front, there has been little problem adapting to the forms of communication. With some added limits to the present sense impression exception 254 (an exception that, along with excited utterance, tends to be overused anyway), the byzantine hearsay structure works well, and no courts struggle with it.
Issues of authentication, however, have caused much more confusion-perhaps because one must have a basic understanding of the technology to grapple with authenticity issues.
255
The hyper-wariness of authenticating social media pages displayed by some courts is bad policy that will appear quaint one day but is impeding litigation now. Because social networking has become ubiquitous and may soon be the primary means of communication for many, the stingy approach to authentication 253. Ilana Gershon, an anthropologist who studies breakups via new social media and the author of BREAKUP 2.0, recounted to me that she came across a case where a wife, on an jointly held email account, posted mean-spirited remarks about her herself and threats to her new boyfriend to make her soon-to-be-ex-husband look vengeful and imbalanced.
254. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Bellin's suggestions regarding present sense impressions and Twitter).
255. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007) (recognizing that authenticating electronically stored information presents a myriad of concerns because "technology changes so rapidly" and is "often new to many judges."). steps above. 272 I disagree both normatively and descriptively with Judge Grimm, who states that "it is critical for courts to start demanding that counsel give more in terms of authentication-and counsel who fail to meet courts' expectations will do so at their own peril." 273 Many courts have taken an appropriately liberal approach to authentication. 274 The standard for authentication by the judge as a gatekeeper should remain low. The technology should not drive a demand for more than the minimal showing that the evidence rules wisely require.
On the issue of page ownership, normally, subpoenaing the service provider or examining the computer in question should not be necessary to prove page ownership. 275 In civil cases, questions of authenticity and admissibility of documents should be hashed out in advance of trial. If a party refuses to stipulate as to page ownership, then resorting to a subpoena is appropriate, with the objecting party paying for the cost of discovery if ownership is found.
In criminal cases, many prosecutors already use subpoenas and computer experts, particularly in cases where the computer evidence is key (such as cases involving solicitation of minors for sex on social media). 276 In such cases, using subpoenas and experts makes the most sense strategically but should not be an absolute requirement.
In many cases, the accused objects that the prosecutor has not authenticated a page but never actually denies that the social media is his own. Such disingenuous and opportunistic objections undermine the function of the evidence rules when there is enough other evidence to prove that the item in question is what the prosecutor purports it to be. Particularly troubling is when the accused in a criminal case attempts to admit evidence from a social network site and is met with a high bar for authentication.
Where there is a genuine objection that the page does not belong to the putative owner, each side has equal access to subpoena power, and the burden should not necessarily be on the proffering party to subpoena the records.
On the issue of whether an impermissible post was made on a site that the owner acknowledges as his, questions of authenticity should almost always be left for the finder-of-fact. Unless the evidence of hacking or capture is irrefutable, questions as to who made an individual post should not be solely determined by the trial court in its gatekeeping role.
